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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Pl ai nti ff-Appe,11 ant',
vs,
DAVID L. WILKINSON,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
18224

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
· This is an action for reinstatement to the staff of the Attorney
General's office pursuant to Sec. 67-5-11 of Utah Code Annotated 1953,
based on plaintiff's status as a career attorney prior to his election
as the Attorney General.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was employed by the Attorney General's office in November
1968 (R. 2).

On May 30, 1975, he was placed on probationary career

status (R. 7).

On January 16, 1976, he achieved permanent career

status (R. 8).

Plaintiff became the Attorney General of Utah in

January, 1977, as a result of being so elected in November, 1976 (R. 2).
After defendant became Attorney Genera 1 in January, 1981 , as a result of
being elected Attorney General in November, 1980, the plaintiff sought on
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-2various occasions to exercise his right to reinstatement on the Attorney
General s staff and was ultimately denied (R. 9).
1

DISPOSITION BELOW
The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 24, 1981 (R. 10, ll).
On December 22, 1981, that motion was granted and an order was made dismissing the complaint with prejudice (R. 80, 81).

The grounds for the

dismissal were not specified but the dismissal order referred to the
memoranda submitted by both parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the order referred to above vacated and the
case remanded to the lower court to try any factual issues involved in
this case and to order judgment on the merits in accordance with the facts
and the law.
POINT I
APPELLANT HAS A STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE REINSTATED TO THE STAFF
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BASED ON SEC. 67-5-11, U.C.A. 1953.
Appellant asserts that his right to be reinstated to the staff of the
Attorney General is expressly provided for in Sec. 67-5-ll which states: as
follows:
An attorney in a career status accepting appointment to
a position in state government which is exempt from the merit
provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 67 shall upon termination of
such appointment or employment,unless he is discharged for
cause, be reinstated in the career status in the office of the
attorney general at a salary not less than that which he was
receiving at the time of his appointment, and the time spent
in such other position shall be credited toward his seniority in
the career service. (Emphasis added.)
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Respondent contends that the above cited statute is not applicable to
appellant because he was serving in an elected position prior to the termination of his term.

Respondent also contends that the key term in Sec.

67-5-11 is "appointment." Appellant submits that the key phrase is

"a~:Ppoint

ment or employment" which clearly includes elected as well as appointed
career attorneys.

By isolating the term 11 appointment 11 out of context

respondent has erroneously restricted the scope of the statute.
Respondent contends that appellant's cause turns on the alleged necessity of adding the words "or is elected" to U.c.A. 67-5-11.

Appellant

insists that no such addition to the statute is necessary and relies upon the
express alternative phrase

or employment . . . , " which phrase the

11

respondent totally ignored in his initial memorandum (R. 12-31).

In his

response memorandum respondent says that the meaning of "or employment" means
"that employment engaged in by the attorney in the position to which he
accepted appointment 11 (R 58).

In other words, "or employment 11 means the same

as Happointment" Which then renders tiJem redundant and thus meaningless.
No principle of statutory construction is more fundamental than that
which requires a comprehensive interpretation which gives meaning to each
word or term used in the context of the balance of the statute.

Here

respondent's construction gives no meaning to the underlined alternative
in " . . . appointment or employment.'' The phrase " . • . appointment or
employment . . . 11 can only be consistently read with the balance of the
statute by treating the words

11

•

•

•

or emp 1oyment . . .

the earlier recited phrase referring to appointment.

11

as altering

It's almost as though

one can read the mind of the draftsman in re-reading the section and
adding the term "or employment to be sure that all the positions referred
11

to, some of which are elective and some appointive, were covered.
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Since no one can obtain and hold any of those positions defined as exempt
from the

provision~

0f the merit system (U.C.A. 67-13-1 et. seq.) except

by appointment or election, the holder of such position "upon termination
of such appointment or employment . . . 11 who is not appointed must be
elected.
The District Court's construction of Sec. 67-5-11 in question is
flawed because it fails to take into consideration the purpose of the
Career Service Act.

One of the most cardinal rules of statutory construc-

tion is to interpret a statute's language in the manner most consistent
with the purpose of the statute so as to carry out the legislative intent.
The specific purpose of the Career Service Act is spelled out clearly in
Sec. 67-5-7 where it expressly states that its purpose is to "establish a
career service system for attorneys employed by the office of the attorney
general that will attract and retain attorneys of proven ability and experience who will devote full time to the service of the state. 11
of accomplishing that purpose was three-fold:

(1)

Its method

make compensation com-

petitive with private practice (salaries were.raised an average of some 30%
upon enactment of the law because the attorneys on career service could not
thereafter practice law privately). Appellant, too, gave up his private
practice upon being placed on career status (R. 7, 8); (2) provide job
security (Sec. 67-5-12); (3) permit career attorneys to seek and hold
political office without loss of their career status if the office was one
that allowed this to be done (Sec. 67-5-13(2)).
Obviously, if the purpose of the Career Service Act is to develop a
career service program to attract and retain high calibre attorneys, it
would be very strange indeed to compel an attorney to elect between
rising to the very top of his career organization, namely becoming the
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-5Attorney General and losing the financial security of his career status
or remaining in a subordinate role in order to preserve that security.
It should be noted that the Attorney General's Career Service Act
grants to such attorneys an absolute right to become a candidate for
political office.

Sec. 67-5-13(2) states

11

granted leave without pay (emphasis added).

upon application he 'shall
11

be

1

It is instructive, in order to

draw necessary distinctions between merit employ ees and those persons subject to the provisions of U.C.A. 67-5-11, et. seq., to note that merit
employees have no statutory right to a leave of absence to run for political
office and be possibly thereafter in the employment of the State.
67-l9-19(l)(a).

See Sec.

It is inconsistent for the legislature to grant attorneys

preferred treatment with respect to becoming political candidates and then
restrict their right to reinstatement after serving in an elective office
to those rare situations in which a person is appointed to fill a vacancy
in an elected office.
or employment . . .

11

Rather, we are compelled to employ the words

11

•••

in U.C.A. 67-5-11 to permit the intended circumstance

of the re-employment of a staff member of the Attorney General s office
1

when that person was not selected by the electorate and was not therefore
11

employed 11 by the State.
Respondent argued below that the District Court would have to alter
11

the terms of the statutes 11 to rule in respondent 1 s favor ( R. 15).

Respon-

dent's case relies on no such judicial activism; present statutory provisions support
respondent's position.

In fact the District Court had disregarded the words "or

employment" in granting the Motion to Dismiss.

This was error.
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Respondent is not arguing that "appointment" means "elected."
:Respondent simply points out that to accomplish the purposes for which
this statute was enacted, it shouldn't and doesn't matter how the attorney came
to serve in an exempt position.

The first and most important consideration

is that an attorney's service to the state is identical regardless of whether
he is elected or appointed.

Secondly, U.C.A. 67-5-11 addresses the exhaustive

alternatives of an attorney who is terminated from a prior 11 appointment or
employment. 11 Thirdly, future benefit to the state based on that attorney's
past experience would be the same whether that person was elected or
appointed.
Most significantly, any apparent conflict between the literal wording
of the first reference to attaining the office (appointment only) and the
second reference (appointment or election) is not a real

confli~t.

Both

r~f

erences should be harmonized because the first reference does not expressly
exclude one who is elected, whereas the second clearly includes whose
elected since one can attain such offices only by appointment or election.
U.C.A. 67-5-11 clearly addresses the circumstance of any attorney who loses
a prior state position, whether appointed or elected, and desires reinstatement on the attorney general's staff from which he emerged when he
was "appointed or employed."

Furthermore, whenever there are two conflicting

provisions, the subsequent provision normally prevails.

Where, as here, both

references became law simultaneously, it can fairly be said that the second
reference was the last legislative expression since it was both written after
and read after the first reference.

More importantly it is much more con-

sonant with the entire purpose and intent of the subject law.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7Respondent argued below that "the clear unambiguous meaning of the statute
(67-5 ... ll)· does'-'tlot i.nclude an elected office 'as being an office to which a career
status attorney in the Attorney General's office can aspire and retain the
right to reinstatement" (R. 17).

However, there is no basis to believe

that the legislature intended to exclude any of the exempt offices specifically
enumerated in Sec. 67-13-6 from applying to Sec. 67-5-11, the controlling
statute.

To reach such a conclusion, the B.istrict Court erroneously read

into it such an exception as "except the elected offices listed in Sec.
67-13-6(a)(l) and the first category of offices listed in Sec. 67-13-6(a)(2). 11
Surprisingly the respondent's interpretation adopted by the lower court·
excludes all elective offices in view of their contention that the subject
statute "would bring into play Sec. 67-13-6(a)(2) but would not require reinstatement of those elected to office referred to in 67-13-6(a)(l ) 11 (R. 14),
particularly when respondent added the emphasis to the word 11 e·1ective 11 when
quoting from 67-13-6(a)(2) which includes ''persons appointed to fill vacancies
in elective positions."

In other words, all of the elective offices listed

in (a)(l) qualify for exemption under either (a)(l) or (a)(2).

Clearly the

position is exempt whether it's filled by election or appointment.

If it

doesn't matter to the legislature whether the office is attained by election
or appointment for purposes of classifying exempt positions as to the Merit
Act generally, then why should it matter to the legislature how that office is
attained when it is applied to a narrow range of state employees, to-wit,
career attorneys?

In fact, as noted above, the argument should be afortiori

in support of those offices being treated the same way whether obtained by
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the elective or the appointive route in view of the preferential treatment of this category of employees with respect to their becoming
candidates for elective office (see P. 5 above).
Respondent's memorandum conjured up a chamber of horrors if appellant
prevailed because of the alleged confusion that would obtain from blurring
the distinction between "election" and "appointment" (R. 17).

As stated

above, the term "appointment or employment" alleviates any concern that
the distinction between the words 11 electionn and "appointment" must be
blurred by reversal of the order challenged by this appeal.

Even if the

second reference in 67-5-ll {11 appointment or employment") did not exist
so the issue was whether or not "accepting appointment" includes being
elected to an office within the meaning of the quoted term as applied to
as 67-5-11, the result would only be a precedent for the use of that term
as it is applied to that particular statute.
in different contexts.
statutes.

Words have different meanings

This is especially true when dealing with different

Therefore, the constitutional provisions and statutes listed

on R. 18 will not be impacted one iota, regardless of how the terms in
question here are interpreted.
Appellant certainly does not argue that to "elect" and to "appoint"
are the same thing.

Thus he has no quarrel with the definitions given

those terms by the Supreme Courts of California and West Virginia quoted
at length on R. 19 and 20.

They simply are of no value in deciding the

case at bar.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court of Salt Lake County erroneously interpreted
Sec. 67-5-11, U.C.A. 1953, to apply only to attorneys who are appointed
to exempt positions. The Order of December 22, 1981, should be vacated
and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

MARK S. GUSTAVSON, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
630 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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